Geopolitical change and its effects on corporate flight operations
Global conflicts place higher burdens on flight crews for planning and execution.
By David Bjellos
ATP/Helo.Gulfstream G650
Senior Contributor
Weeks prior to the Jan 3, 2026 capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the US positioned dozens of warships and materiel in the Caribbean region. Similar activities preceded the US bombing of Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility on Jun 22, 2025, with a strategic buildup in the Persian Gulf and eastern Mediterranean in the month prior. Airmen will benefit greatly by staying abreast of conflicts and the real-time military activity which almost always precedes tactical actions. Preflight planning/options can be discussed proactively and reasonable alternatives considered.
FAA issued a NOTAM on Jan 3, 2026 prohibiting all US-registered aircraft from operating within the Curacao, San Juan PR, Piarco (Trinidad & Tobago), and Maiquetía airspaces. It would have been impossible to predict when the airspace would close or how many regions it would encompass. If you had been the PIC of a flight to Puerto Rico or the Windward/Leeward Islands for Christmas or New Year, would you have informed your passengers of the build-up and possible airspace closures? This is an easy after-the-fact question, but it’s a worthy example for the future.
Contemporary geopolitical dynamics have increased the complexity and risk profile of international corporate flight operations.
The proliferation of regional armed conflicts, state-on-state tensions, economic sanctions, and hybrid warfare has led to more frequent airspace closures, overflight restrictions, and rapidly evolving regulatory directives.
Unlike historical conflict patterns, modern geopolitical disruptions often develop with limited warning and can affect civil aviation well beyond the immediate area of hostilities.
For corporate operators, these changes have a direct influence on route planning, fuel strategy, alternates, crew duty considerations, and insurance coverage.
The expansion of advanced surface-to-air missile systems, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference, cyber activity targeting navigation and communications, and the politicization of airspace access have increased the importance of proactive conflict zone risk assessment – even in regions previously considered stable.
Regulatory responses from authorities such as FAA, EASA, and ICAO nearly always lag tactical developments, placing greater responsibility on operators to evaluate emerging threats independently.
In addition, geopolitical measures, including sanctions, diplomatic disputes, and sudden bilateral airspace denials can invalidate previously approved routings or permits with little notice.
Therefore, corporate flight departments must integrate continuous geopolitical monitoring into operational decision-making, ensuring alignment with regulatory requirements, insurer limitations, and corporate duty-of-care obligations.
In this environment, conservative risk tolerance, documented decision processes, and authoritative intelligence sources are essential to maintaining operational continuity and crew/passenger safety.
This table represents a very basic but important tool for international pilots to add to their international operations manual. Each risk factor should be expanded to suit the routing and destination, with particular emphasis on alternates (medical and mechanical) enroute.
As of January 2026, armed conflicts and wars – ranging from major inter-state hostilities to civil wars and significant insurgencies – are active in the Americas (Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, and Venezuela), Africa (Burkina Faso, DRC, Eritrea–Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan), Asia (Afghanistan, India–Pakistan, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand–Cambodia, and Taiwan), Europe (Russia–Ukraine), and the Middle East (Iran–Israel, Israel–Palestine, Lebanon, Syria–Yemen).
These conflicts represent significant airspace blocks in major regions of the world where civil aviation is active. The existing geopolitical risk and potential future exposure demand careful consideration. This is further focused on planned and emergency alternate airports – potentially troublesome for flights of maximum endurance and limited routing options.
Under the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
Overflight and landing rights are granted via bilateral or multilateral agreements, not by default. Consequently, political decisions by sovereign states can have an immediate effect on permissible routings. Basic constraints are:
• State of registry restrictions, eg, FAA, EASA, country-specific civil aviation authorities (CAAs).
• Operator’s state regulations. These may be different from those of the state of registry (eg, Cayman Islands- and San Marino-registered aircraft operated by a 3rd-party state).
• Insurance policy exclusions.
FAA oversight under 14 CFR
Part 91
Understanding the sovereignty of airspace as described by ICAO, it becomes clear that accountability and liability for any given flight are critical.
We will explore the Part 91 operator here since they are the most vulnerable due to lack of regulatory oversight.
Corporate international operations conducted under Part 91 differ fundamentally in governing structure and oversight from Part 121 and Part 135 operations.
While Part 91 offers greater operational flexibility, it also places increased responsibility directly on the pilot in command (PIC) and the flight department for regulatory compliance, risk assessment, and operational decision-making.
Key distinctions include no FAA-mandated dispatch release requirement, no compulsory regulatory oversight of routing or geopolitical risk, no enforced FAA security programs (passengers or destination), and limited prescriptive guidance for international operations.
As a result, Part 91 crews must ensure compliance independently, not only with FAA regulations, but also with foreign CAAs via their aeronautical information publication (AIP), national security requirements, customs and immigration rules, and international sanctions systems. The last item is critical and often overlooked, even by international service providers (ISPs).
Unlike airline operations, most Part 91 corporate flight departments operate without a centralized, dedicated dispatch team. Even when 3rd-party flight planning vendors are used, legal and operational responsibility remains with the PIC.
This decentralized model increases exposure to geopolitical risk because intelligence interpretation may vary by provider; risk tolerance is often indeterminate, informal, and increasingly subjective as it may be based on prior experience operating in that region; and decision-making authority rests heavily on individual captains, so mission completion and desire to please the passengers may influence some individuals to a greater extent.
Corporate Part 91 international operations offer unparalleled flexibility but carry proportionately higher responsibility for geopolitical risk management. Without the regulatory scaffolding of Part 121 or 135, corporate pilots and flight departments must act as their own dispatchers, security analysts, and regulatory compliance officers.
A disciplined, policy-driven approach to geopolitical considerations – integrated with regulatory awareness and sound aeronautical judgment – allows Part 91 operators to conduct global operations safely while protecting crew, passengers, assets, and organizational reputation. Best practice is for corporate operators to establish internal geopolitical risk policies as an addendum to their existing international operations manual (IOM).
Insurance considerations
Insurance for your automobile is complex and not easy to understand or apply. War-time risk and war-zone exclusions for aircraft are extremely complex, even for experts.
Most insurers have extremely comprehensive prohibitions for Part 91 operators (which can change rapidly), and all airmen should be familiar with their coverage, even if it is provided by a management company.
Best practices for Part 91 operators are:
• Treat insurance as a flight-critical item.
• Obtain written confirmation of coverage for routing, FIRs, and alternates.
• If you are an independent operator, do not rely on verbal broker assurances.
• Think through all alternates outside excluded regions. If not feasible operationally, consider alternative routing.
• Document all PIC risk decisions carefully. Many departments accomplish this through the FRAT, but the insurance risk issues should be done separately.
• Ask your insurer for an insurance decision flowchart for high-risk areas in general, and route-specific flowcharts for any questionable planned routes. Document everything.
Key takeaways
There is no comprehensive checklist or solution to every possible geopolitical flight risk available, because the variables are too staggering. And, very clearly, if you smell smoke or have an active fire or serious mechanical emergency, any runway is a good runway.
Considering the phrase “Success is where preparation and opportunity meet” helps define the challenges we face now and in the future.
Consider adding the following links to your daily reading list, and if you are not yet a member of OpsGroup or MedAire, reflect on the value of their collective data and expertise. If you are an account with a management company, you’re almost certain to have access to one or both.
Senior contributor David Bjellos has been writing for PP since 2004. He is an active airman flying a G650 based in south Florida.